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Abstract -- Presently in the Nordic day-ahead market, zonal 
pricing or market splitting is used for relieving congestion 
between a predetermined set of price areas. Constraints internal 
to the price areas are resolved by counter trading or 
redispatching in the regulation market. In a model of the Nordic 
electricity market we consider an hourly case from winter 2010 
and present analyses of the effects of different congestion 
management methods on prices, quantities, surpluses and 
network utilization. We also study the effects of two different 
ways of taking into account security constraints. 
 
Index Terms—Congestion management, Zonal pricing, Day-
ahead market simulation 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
HE Nord Pool Spot area presently covers Norway, 
Sweden, Denmark, Finland and Estonia. Previously, 
prices were also calculated for a German price area (Kontek). 
However, since November 2009 this price area has been 
replaced by market coupling with the Central Western 
European area. At Nord Pool Spot, area prices are calculated 
for the day-ahead market. Since this market is settled many 
hours before real time, imbalances occur and they are settled 
by intraday trading in Elbas and in the close to real time 
regulation market. Nord Pool Spot is a voluntary pool; 
however, trades between Elspot areas are mandatory. Nord 
Pool Spot covers about 70 % of the physical power in the 
Nordic region (except Iceland), and the pool is used not only 
for mandatory trades but also to increase legitimacy of prices 
and as a counterpart. 
There are three types of bids at Nord Pool Spot. These are 
hourly bids for individual hours, block bids that create 
dependency between hours, and, finally, flexible hourly bids, 
which are sell bids for hours with highest prices. Here we 
illustrate different congestion management methods in a single 
hour market, and we treat all bids as hourly bids. Accepted 
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block bids are part of the bid curves, as price independent buy 
or sell bids. 
The day-ahead market takes grid constraints partly into 
account by calculating different prices for relatively few price 
areas. Presently there are 13 price areas in the Nord Pool area. 
Transfer capacities between these areas are given by the 
system operators before the market agents submit bids, and 
Nord Pool Spot then calculates area prices. This means that 
zonal pricing or market splitting is used in the day-ahead 
market for congestions between a predetermined set of price 
areas. Constraints internal to the price areas are resolved by 
counter trading or redispatching in the regulation market. Thus 
two congestions management methods are in action 
simultaneously. For more detailed descriptions of congestion 
management methods in the Nordic market we refer readers to 
[2], [4], and the websites of Nord Pool Spot and the Nordic 
TSOs. The system operators in the Nord Pool area are 
transmission system operators owning and controlling the 
national grids. They are incentive regulated and the net effects 
of the incomes from zonal pricing and the expenses from 
redispatching are passed on to domestic customers. 
The chosen congestion management method affects the 
efficiency of the Nordic electricity market and the prices 
quoted in the day-ahead market at Nord Pool Spot. In our 
research we particularly want to study how the 
implementation of a more detailed network model and load 
flow calculation of the spot price will contribute to more 
efficient price signals to producers and consumers, price 
signals that will depend to a larger extent on location. 
II.  RESEARCH AGENDA 
An important element in the design of the Nordic electricity 
market is the market clearing procedures when capacity 
constraints in the transmission network are binding. The 
general design of the electricity market, for example, with 
regards to the time dimension, which products are traded and 
the bidding rules, determines simultaneously the constraints 
and opportunities that we have in the choice of methods. For 
the analysis of congestion management within an exchange 
area, with a market infrastructure that allows a certain number 
of geographic prices on an hourly basis, the optimal economic 
load flow model is often used as the reference point. This is 
normally a single period model that maximizes economic 
profit, given the supply and demand curves that exist for each 
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node in the network, as well as the limitations imposed by 
thermal and other capacity constraints in the transmission 
system. The optimal load flow is a snapshot, and the dynamic 
adjustment over time is left to the players, which means that 
supply curves for a period include opportunity costs such as 
water values for hydro power producers, etc. The question 
then is whether the procedures for market clearing can achieve 
something similar to the optimal load flow with optimal prices 
for each generation and load point (optimal nodal prices). 
An analysis of the effects of various methods for 
congestion management in the Nordic electricity market may 
take as a starting point an hourly optimal load flow model. 
The effectiveness of the mechanism can then be evaluated 
based on the degree to which one can realize the optimal load 
flow. In the Nordic power market this is dependent on the 
formulation of practical rules for area price determination at 
Nord Pool Spot. These involve a number of simplifications 
and approximations in terms of assumptions underlying the 
optimal load flow calculation. For a start, prices are not noted 
for each node in the system, instead prices are uniform within 
larger areas of the network. The number of price areas and 
how the boundaries of these are exactly determined, therefore, 
affects economic efficiency. Another simplification is that the 
companies supply their bids within each zone and not at each 
generation or load point. This results in uncertainty regarding 
the effects of a bid on the system, and consequently a 
possibility that the capacity control is imprecise. Likewise, 
area prices imply that transmission capacities are often 
aggregated over several transmission lines. This also results in 
a less fine-tuned capacity control compared to if line 
capacities were used individually. In the whole Nordic system 
there is a practice of moving a transmission constraint within a 
price area to an area boundary by reducing the capacity 
between price areas. Previous work [1] and [2] has shown that 
this is a practice that can be costly and greatly affects the 
levels of area prices in different regions. Incentives for this 
practice are also influenced by the network regulation models 
and the fact that the two congestion management methods 
described above normally differ in how they affect grid 
revenues and system operation costs. 
We distinguish between two variants of price aggregation: 
economic and physical, later referred to as optimal and 
simplified zonal prices. Under economic aggregation the 
topology of the network is represented in full while prices 
within zones are required to be uniform. Under physical 
aggregation the network is highly simplified thus neglecting 
the physical characteristics of the power flow, resembling the 
current practice in the Nordic market. In our analysis, zone 
allocations are as defined by the Nordic TSOs for both types 
of aggregation. Fig. 1 demonstrates the current map of the 
market. 
Optimal zonal prices have been studied by [1]. They are 
second best compared to optimal nodal prices. Different 
divisions are preferred by different agents (producers and 
consumers in a node have opposite interests for instance) and 
 
Fig. 1. Elspot market overview, March 2012. Source: www.nordpoolspot.com. 
 
grid revenues may be negative under optimal zonal prices. 
There may be many variants of “adverse flows”, i.e. power 
flowing from high prices to low prices, and it is very difficult 
to find an optimal zone division. Moreover, the optimal zone 
allocation depends on market characteristics and hourly costs, 
topology of the network etc., which makes it difficult to 
decide upon a division if it is to be fixed for a longer period. If 
there are too few zones, it may be impossible to find prices 
that are uniform within predefined areas and in addition clear 
the market subject to all relevant constraints. 
In the simplified zonal price model, detailed information on 
nodal bids is lost, and constraints within a zone are not 
represented. Setting capacities on aggregated lines is difficult, 
if they are too restrictive, the power system may not be fully 
utilized, if they are too encouraging, the market outcomes may 
result in infeasible flows. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section III 
we briefly describe the model and calibration of the data as 
well as simulations run to ensure that the model approximates 
the real-life case. Section IV compares prices and quantities 
obtained from the two types of zonal aggregation to the nodal 
solution. In Section V we describe changes in surpluses under 
different models. Section VI compares prices and quantities 
with an alternative implementation of security constrains in 
the models. Conclusions to the analyses are presented in 
Section VII. 
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III.  THE OPTFLOW MODEL AND CALIBRATION OF DATA 
We analyze the effect of different congestion management 
methods on hourly prices/quantities for the case of a winter 
supply/demand scenario based on hour 19 on December 15, 
2010. The Norwegian part of the network model is presented 
in detail and roughly corresponds to the Norwegian central 
grid. The network model for Sweden is simpler while the other 
Elspot price areas and adjacent countries are represented as a 
single node each, see Fig. 2. 
We have also included security constraints for the 
Norwegian part of the network. These may be considered 
heuristics used by the system operator to express N-1 
constraints. Each security constraint models the potential 
outage of a network component. The outage of a component 
will typically lead to a redirection of the power flow, which 
could be determined endogenously as part of the optimization 
procedure or it could be specified in advance. The latter 
approach can be modeled as so-called “cut” constraints where 
total capacity is specified over a number of lines, or a 
combination of lines and generation/load quantities. As 
mentioned earlier we do not include block bids and ramping 
restrictions and assume that the choice of congestion 
management method does not affect the bid curves. In practice 
this might not be true, since the chosen bottleneck method will 
affect prices, and hence the expected water values that are 
embedded in the bid curves. 
The OptFlow formulation can be roughly expressed as the 
following: 
Max (consumer benefit – production cost) 
s.t. load flow constraints 
thermal capacity constraints 
security constraints. 
The model above provides a solution to the nodal pricing 
problem. The objective function represents the total social 
welfare given as total consumer benefit less total production 
cost. Load flow constraints represent Kirchhoff’s laws and 
thermal constraints define transmission capacities on the lines. 
Security constraints determine total flow over a set of 
transmission lines and possibly generation/load quantities that 
cannot be exceeded. 
For the economic aggregation solution an additional set of 
constraints ensures that prices are equal within zones. For the 
physical aggregation solution Kirchhoff’s second law is 
disregarded and flow capacity constraints are defined only for 
the interzonal flows. 
We have calibrated hourly supply and demand curves based 
on Nord Pool Spot sale and purchase bids, Statnett data on 
nodal production and exchange, information on generation 
technologies and capacities, the location of energy-intensive 
industry, as well as information about imports and exports 
provided online by Nord Pool Spot. 
The supply bid curves that we have used have between one 
and six linear segments. Actual capacities and generation 
source types are reflected. Demand bid curves are also piece-
wise linear and include inelastic and elastic segments. The 
aggregated OptFlow demand curves closely follow the Nord 
Pool bid curves in shape; however, they give higher demand 
for any price level. This is not unexpected, since the OptFlow 
 
Fig. 2. OptFlow Nordic grid map. 
 
curves are based on total load, including load that is not 
channeled through Nord Pool Spot. Table I below compares 
the actual Elspot prices (I) to the prices obtained from the 
OptFlow model solved with the real (II) and calibrated (III) 
bid curves. For the OptFlow computations we have used the 
actual Nord Pool capacities for (aggregate) interzonal 
connections. Intrazonal capacity constraints, constraints 
related to Kirchhoff’s second law, as well as security 
constraints, have all been relaxed. Hence, the OptFlow model 
closely resembles the model used for the computation of 
Elspot prices. From Table I we see that the Elspot prices (I) 
and the area prices calculated by the OptFlow model with 
Nord Pool Spot bid curves (II) match exactly. This shows that 
the OptFlow model is capable of reproducing the Elspot 
results when using the same bid curves. Moreover, the 
differences between the actual Elspot prices (I) and the 
OptFlow area prices calculated on the basis of the 
disaggregated OptFlow bid curves (III) are quite small. 
Contrary to (I) and (II), the disaggregated bid curves cover 
100 % of production and consumption, thus it is difficult to 
calibrate the bid curves so as to match the prices of the 
aggregated curves exactly. However, the relatively small 
differences between (I) and (III) show that the disaggregation 
we have developed works reasonably well in aggregate, 
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although it still leaves a great deal of uncertainty with respect 
to how accurate the distribution of production and 
consumption on the nodes within the bidding areas is. This is, 
however, as close as we can come with the data provided. 
 
TABLE I 
BID CURVE CALIBRATION – ELSPOT AND OPTFLOW PRICES 
 
The OptFlow production and consumption quantities with 
Elspot bids (II) differ somewhat from the OptFlow quantities 
with calibrated bid curves (III), especially for Norway, but the 
exchange quantities match quite well as presented in Table II 
below. Based on the limited data available on disaggregated 
 
TABLE II 
BID CURVE CALIBRATION – ELSPOT AND OPTFLOW QUANTITIES 
 
 
bid curves, we conclude that the disaggregation in (III) is a 
reasonable starting point for analyzing different congestion 
management methods for our case. In order to evaluate the 
effects on the disaggregated power system, we need all 
production and consumption represented. Thus, the prices and 
quantities corresponding to column (III) are the starting point 
of our comparisons, i.e. in the following analyses column (III) 
represents the “Nord Pool Spot” area price solution. 
In the following section, we compare prices and quantities 
for different congestion management methods, including nodal 
pricing, optimal zonal pricing (taking into account all 
constraints) and simplified zonal pricing (area prices like Nord 
Pool Spot, disregarding loop flow and intrazonal constraints). 
IV.  PRICE COMPARISONS 
Table III compares four sets of prices for our case hour in 
winter 2010. Actual Nord Pool Spot prices are given in the 
first price column (corresponding to (I)/(II) in Table I), while 
the second and third columns show, respectively, the 
simplified and optimal zonal prices calculated by the OptFlow 
model. The simplified zonal prices correspond to (III) in Table 
I, while optimal zonal prices take into account the specific 
locations of all bids on the nodes and all constraints of the 
disaggregated power system. The three rightmost columns 
show descriptive statistics for the optimal nodal prices within 
each price zone. 
TABLE III 
NODAL VS ZONAL PRICES 
 
We see that when moving from simplified zonal prices to 
optimal zonal or nodal prices; prices increase in zones NO1, 
NO2 and NO5 while prices decrease in NO4. Prices in other 
areas remain almost the same or vary around the 
corresponding simplified zonal prices. NO5 experiences a 
tremendous price increase compared to the simplified zonal 
prices, and the maximum nodal price in NO5 is equal to the 
price cap at Nord Pool Spot of 2000 Euros/MWh (the optimal 
zonal price in area NO5 is also close to the price cap). Note, 
however, that the price vectors are not directly comparable, 
since actual and simplified zonal prices do not take into 
account all constraints in the system. We will come back to 
this point later. 
In Fig. 3 below we have sorted the optimal nodal prices 
from the lowest to the highest. The colors show which bidding 
area the nodal prices belong to. On the first axis the price 
columns are weighted by the consumption in the nodes. The 
figure shows that only a few prices are close to the maximum 
price, whereas the other prices take on values mostly below 
132 Euros/MWh. We see that most of the price variation is 
linked to a small share of the total consumption. 
 
Fig. 3. Variation in nodal prices. 
 
Looking more closely at the price data, we study the nodes 
with prices equal to the price cap. We see that at the market 
clearing consumption quantity in one of those nodes, Arna, is 
on the horizontal extension of the demand curve that represent 
the price cap of Nord Pool Spot. 
This is illustrated in Fig. 4. This is the optimal solution 
returned when allowing for nodal pricing and taking into 
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account all constraints of the problem, i.e. both the thermal 
capacity constraints and the cut constraints imposed for 
security reasons. The solution is technically feasible in the 
OptFlow model, however, in economic terms, we are dealing 
with an infeasibility. The difference between the inelastic 
demand and the “market clearing” demand can be interpreted 
as the necessary curtailment of consumption in the node in 
order to obtain a feasible flow. 
 
Fig. 4. Bid curve and market clearing price and quantity, Arna (NO5). 
 
This corresponds to the situation referred to by [3]; saying 
that for long periods the Norwegian power system has been 
operated at below agreed upon security standards due to high 
loads and/or lack of transmission capacity. In a nodal pricing 
system this becomes very visible, as do the representations of 
the security constraints imposed. In the following analyses we 
relax the infeasible cut constraints (in our case particularly in 
the Bergen area): two cut constraints are removed from the 
disaggregated optimization problems of the OptFlow model. 
The relaxation will change the optimal nodal and zonal prices, 
while the simplified zonal prices will be unaffected, since the 
cut constraints are not directly included in this price 
calculation anyway1. 
Summary data of the new prices is given in Table IV and 
shows that all prices are now below 141 Euros/MWh. Moving 
from simplified zonal prices to optimal zonal or nodal prices 
results in price increases in NO1, NO2, NO3, NO5, and FI. 
Prices decrease in NO4, while for the rest of the areas optimal 
zonal and nodal prices vary around the simplified zonal prices 
or are fairly unaffected by the change (EE). Again, the price 
vectors are not directly comparable, since actual and 
simplified zonal prices do not take into account all constraints 
in the system, thus at these prices, the resulting flows will not 
comply with all of the system constraints. 
                                                          
1 In practice, the cut constraints may affect the import and export 
capacities that the system operators set between the bidding areas and that are 
given to the Elspot market clearing. 
TABLE IV 
NODAL VS ZONAL PRICES WITHOUT BERGEN CUT CONSTRAINT 
 
 
Fig. 5 shows the optimal nodal prices for consumption and 
production respectively, where prices are sorted from lowest 
to highest, and column widths represent volumes. For a quick 
visual comparison of aggregate price differences, the 
simplified zonal prices are shown in a similar way represented 
by the thick black line. Since the simplified zonal prices are 
also sorted from lowest to highest, the curves cannot be 
compared directly for each MW, in the sense that a specific 
 
Fig. 5. Variation in nodal prices without Bergen cut constraint. 
 
point on the first axis may represent different geographical 
locations in the two curves. Thus the zones may have different 
sequencing in the two figures and in the two curves shown. 
Comparing the total volume weighted prices (i.e. the areas 
under the curves) we notice that for this hourly case, the nodal 
prices are on average higher than the simplified zonal prices. 
The reason for this is that nodal prices include shadow prices 
for all transmission constraints (except the cut constraints that 
we excluded), whereas the simplified zonal prices do not, thus 
implying a solution that results in infeasible flows. We also 
notice that the nodes in specific bidding areas like NO1 and 
NO5 are placed at different locations along the first axis, i.e. 
some nodes should be in the lower end of the price 
distribution, whereas others should be in the high price end, 
although for NO1 and NO5 especially, the nodal price 
differences within the zones are not very large. 
In Fig. 6 we compare simplified and optimal zonal prices. 
The figures are similar to those in Fig. 5 except that we have 
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sorted simplified zonal prices from lowest to highest and 
shown the corresponding optimal zonal price in the same 
sequence of zones. Thus it is easier to compare the changes 
that result in the zonal prices from taking into account all 
constraints and the specific location of bids to nodes (optimal  
 
Fig. 6. Variation in optimal zonal prices without Bergen cut constraint. 
 
zonal prices) instead of only a subset of the constraints or 
some indirect representation of the constraints (simplified 
zonal prices). Fig. 6 elaborates on what was already shown in 
Table IV; that some zonal prices increase while others 
decrease. Moreover, as a weighted average, prices increase 
when all constraints are taken care of in the optimal zonal 
prices. The simplified zonal prices are lower on average 
(volume weighted), but on the other hand, they result in 
infeasible power flows. 
V.  SURPLUSES 
In Table V we show the changes in surplus for the three 
pricing solutions compared to the unconstrained market 
solution. The absolute values of consumer surpluses are not 
very meaningful, since demand is very inelastic, at least for 
high prices, and we have capped the consumer surplus at the 
price cap of 2000 Euros/MWh. This way, the consumer 
surplus and the total social surplus are very much affected by 
the price cap. Moreover, since the surpluses of the simplified 
zonal solution are not comparable to the optimal nodal and 
zonal prices that take into account all constraints, we have 
shown the number of overloaded thermal and security 
constraints in the last row of the table. 
For the present case, we see that moving from simplified 
zonal prices to optimal zonal or nodal prices leads to a 
reduction in consumer surplus, and an increase in producer 
surplus and grid revenue. Since we disregard many constraints 
in the simplified zonal solution, the total surplus goes down 
somewhat, however, this must be balanced off by the 
infeasibilities that are left in the simplified zonal solution and 
which are dealt with in the optimal zonal and optimal nodal 
solutions. In the end the infeasibilities must be taken care of in 
the simplified zonal solution too. This may be costly for 
society, and this cost is not reflected in Table V. Alternatively, 
we could model counter trading, and take into account any 
efficiency effect from that. However, it is not straightforward 
how to do that, so we choose here to compare solutions by a 
combination of surpluses and a summary description of 
infeasibilities. 
 
TABLE V 
UNLIMITED SURPLUS AND SURPLUS DIFFERENCES (1000 EUROS) 
 
VI.  SECURITY CONSTRAINTS 
In this section we consider a different approach to 
incorporating approximate security constraints. Instead of the 
cut constraints described above we reduce the capacities of the 
individual lines to a fraction of the nominal thermal capacities, 
like in [5]. Graphs in Fig. 7 demonstrate price changes 
(weighted by consumed quantities on the first axis) and the 
utilization of the cut constraints in the corresponding 
solutions. Only the cuts on the left hand sides of Fig. 8, Fig. 10 
and Fig. 12 with utilization above 100 % are violated. In the 
price diagrams in Fig. 7, Fig. 9 and Fig. 11 we compare nodal 
prices with the reduced individual line constraints to nodal 
prices with thermal and cut constraints (solid lines) and 
simplified zonal prices (dotted lines). 
When capacities decrease, the nodal prices increase and the 
price differences increase. On the other hand, the number of 
overloaded cuts decreases, and when the capacity is set to only 
70 % of the nominal capacity only 3 cut constraints are 
overloaded, i.e. the infeasible Bergen cuts and the Nordland 
cut (NO4). We can also see from Fig. 9 and Fig. 11 that prices 
in NO1 are most affected when capacity is decreased. 
 
 
 
Fig. 7. Nodal prices with line capacities set to 100% of nominal capacities. 
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Fig. 8. Security cut capacity utilization with line capacities set to 100% of 
nominal capacities. 
 
 
 
Fig. 9. Nodal prices with line capacities set to 80% of nominal capacities. 
 
 
Fig. 10. Security cut capacity utilization with line capacities set to 80% of 
nominal capacities. 
 
 
 
Fig. 11. Nodal prices with line capacities set to 70% of nominal capacities. 
 
 
Fig. 12. Security cut capacity utilization with line capacities set to 70% of 
nominal capacities. 
 
Table VI shows the changes in surpluses and infeasibilities 
for the three cases above. When restricting capacities, surplus 
is transferred from consumers to producers and the grid. When 
capacity is lowered to 70 % of the nominal values, we see that 
the grid revenues increase a lot, and that the total social 
surplus is also negatively affected. Note, however, again that 
the surpluses cannot be directly compared as the solutions 
differ when it comes to infeasibilities. 
 
TABLE VI 
UNLIMITED SURPLUS AND SURPLUS DIFFERENCES (1000 EUROS) WITH 
DIFFERENT SECURITY CONSTRAINTS 
 
VII.  CONCLUSIONS 
We have simulated the effects of different congestion 
management methods on the market outcomes for a specific 
high load winter hour using given bid curves, i.e. we assume 
that bids do not change even when the congestion 
management method does. Moreover, we have focused on two 
ways of representing approximations of N-1 type security 
constraints. 
The calibrated nodal bid curves match quite well the 
aggregated Nord Pool Spot bid curves, however, the 
disaggregation depends on many assumptions and may not 
reflect the actual nodal bid curves underlying the real Nord 
Pool Spot bid curves. Thus, the simulation performed must be 
evaluated not with respect to the actual power flows on the 
specific hour we have considered, but with the calibrated 
nodal bid curves as the starting point. 
The findings of the analyses indicate that in many cases the 
price changes with nodal pricing are not so dramatic and the 
price variation is related to small volumes of production and 
consumption. The choice of method for representing security 
constraints may be at least as important. 
In future research we will incorporate counter trading in the 
model in order to compare infeasible to feasible solutions. 
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